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Abstract
We analyze a rating agency’s incentives to distort ratings in a model with
a monopolistic profit maximizing rating agency, a continuum of heterogeneous
firms, and a competitive market of risk-neutral investors. Firms sell bonds,
the value of a firm’s bond is known to the firm and observable by the agency,
but not by buyers. Firms can choose to get a rating. The rating agency can
reveal a signal of arbitrary precision about the quality of the bond. In contrast
to the existing literature, we allow aggregate uncertainty. As in the existing
literature, one rating class is optimal. However, the rating agency does not
choose a socially optimal cutoff: the agency is more likely to be too lenient if
the distribution of aggregate uncertainty has a lower mean, a higher variance,
and is more left skewed. It is more likely to be too strict if the opposite holds.
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∗We want to thank Dirk Hoffmann, Raphaël Levy, Leonard Nakumura, Martin Peitz, André
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1 Introduction
Ratings and other quality certifications by third parties play an important role in
today’s economy. For instance, the volume of rated debt issues was over $8,000
billion in 2006. Ratings are used by investors to guide their investment decisions.
They are also crucial for financial regulation: Basel III includes ratings as one cri-
terion for the calculation of the capital adequacy requirements for banks. So does
the Solvency II Directive of the European Union, passed on March 11, 2014, which
harmonizes insurance regulation in the European Union and is scheduled to come
into effect on January 1, 2016.
However, ratings as a basis of regulation have been viewed controversially, es-
pecially after the financial crisis. The major concern is that the ratings used for
regulation are given by rating agencies, which may have an incentive to distort rat-
ings in order to maximize profit. These concerns have been expressed both in public
policy debates and in investigations and lawsuits against rating agencies.1 As a re-
action to this concern, Section 939A of the Dodd-Frank Act (effective since 2010)
requires that all federal agencies “must remove any reference to or requirement of
reliance on credit ratings”.
The current article addresses the question of incentives to distort ratings by a
profit maximizing rating agency under particular consideration of aggregate uncer-
tainty. Aggregate uncertainty plays a major role in many markets. As an example,
for subprime mortgages the question was not only how good the subprime mortgages
were that one particular financial institution invested in. The question was whether
subprime mortgages as a whole were a sufficiently safe investment.
To investigate the effect of aggregate uncertainty on incentives to distort, we
consider a model in which all other possible incentives to distort are shut down.
In particular, we consider a monopolistic rating agency that can credibly commit
1As the most recent example, see the settlement between Standard’s and Poors, the U.S. De-
partment of Justice, and 19 states attorneys general that includes a payment of $1.5 billion by
S&P in the context of the rating of securities backed by subprime mortgages. While “S&P did not
admit to any violations of law”, the rating agency “did sign a statement of facts acknowledging
that its executives in 2005 delayed implementing new models that produced more negative ratings”
(Viswanatha and Freifeld, 2015).
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to a rating strategy in a one period model. This shuts down effects such as forum
shopping, reneging on the ratings strategy, or reputational cycles.
Besides the rating agency there is a continuum of sellers selling bonds. There is
a continuum of investors seeking to buy bonds. The mass of investors is larger than
the mass of sellers, so that competition leads to prices being bid up to the expected
value of a bond. The quality of a seller’s bond is perfectly known to the seller, but
unknown to investors. The rating agency has a technology to perfectly observe the
seller’s quality. Sellers can decide whether they want to be rated. The aggregate
distribution of sellers’ types is initially unknown to all market participants, except
for a common prior about the distribution of the aggregate states of the world. The
states of the world differ by a different aggregate distribution of sellers’ types. After
sellers get rated, the aggregate state of the world is revealed to all market participants
and investors buy the bonds. The price depends on the expected quality in a rating
class for the realized aggregate state of the world.
We show that in accordance to the existing literature, a profit maximizing rating
agency will choose a coarse binary rating: either investment grade or junk bonds.
However, in sharp contrast to the existing literature, aggregate uncertainty leads to
the cutoff not being at the socially optimal level. Whether the rating agency has
an incentive to be too lenient (a negative cutoff) or too strict (a positive cutoff) is
pinned down by three moments of the aggregate belief distribution. The aggregate
belief distribution is defined as follows: Take for every state of the world the mean
quality of bonds that would be bought if quality were publicly known. Market
participants’ belief distribution of these means is the aggregate belief distribution.
The rating agency has more of an incentive to be too lenient if the distribution has
a low mean, a high variance, and a low higher order skewness (defined as the sum
of the third and higher moments). A low higher order skewness can be thought of
as a left skewed distribution, i.e. with a high probability bonds have a mean quality
above average, but the distribution has a fat tail at the bottom which implies that
with a small probability bonds have a very low mean quality. The opposite result
holds for a larger mean, lower variance, and a larger higher order skewness. These
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results can be interpreted as two opposite effects on the rating agency’s incentive to
distort ratings. One effect is procyclical: they have an incentive to be too lenient
before the outbreak of a crisis (interpreting this period as a period with a large
variance and left skewness of aggregate uncertainty) and an incentive to be too
strict after the outbreak of the crisis. The other effect is countercyclical: a higher
mean in market beliefs about aggregate uncertainty (likely to occur before a crisis)
gives the rating agency an incentive to be too strict and a lower mean (after a crisis)
to be too lenient. While anecdotal evidence suggests that the procyclical effect is
stronger,2 it is ultimately an empirical question, which effect dominates.
This sheds light on a disturbing aspect of using credit ratings for capital adequacy
regulation: they may introduce procyclicality into the system. Capital adequacy
requirements based on ratings (such as in Basel III and the Solvency II Directive)
may be too lenient before and too strict after the crisis. Our theory can be seen
to justify two possible policies to deal with this problem. One policy, as in Section
939A of the Frank-Dodd Act, is to remove any reference to or requirement of reliance
on credit ratings from regulation. This approach has the advantage of having a clear
unambiguous rule. However, this is also viewed controversially, since it may be too
costly for smaller banks to replace external credit ratings with internal credit rating
systems.3 An alternative policy would be to use credit ratings, but take into account
their cyclicality in regulation. In particular, if one believes that the procyclical
element dominates, capital adequacy requirements based on ratings should include
countercyclical elements to counterbalance procyclicality.
We provide two extensions of our main result. First, we outline an empirical
strategy to determine whether the procyclical or the countercyclical effect dominates.
While an empirical analysis is beyond of the scope of this paper, we show how the
moments of the distribution of aggregate uncertainty can be identified from the
prices of financial derivatives.
2In hindsight, observers of financial markets considered the ratings of agencies to have been too
lenient before and too strict after the crisis.
3See, for example, http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/an-easy-fix-to-dodd-franks-
credit-ratings-rule-1063396-1.html.
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Second, we extend the model to a setup with risk aversion. A model with risk
aversion explains why there are multiple rating categories and not just one (i.e.
investment grade, and possibly a second, speculative grade). The reason is that
with risk aversion, investors value more precise information about the quality of
an asset to reduce risk. We provide numerical examples to illustrate that a hybrid
model of risk aversion and aggregate uncertainty preserves the key insights about
the rating agency being too lenient or too strict, but additionally predicts multiple
rating categories.
Our paper relates to a large literature on rating agencies, experts, and repu-
tation. We differ from all papers mentioned below by having market participants’
uncertainty about the aggregate distribution of qualities as the driving force that
determines the rating strategy.
If one were to remove aggregate uncertainty from our model, it would reduce
to the model in Lizzeri (1999)’s seminal contribution on certification intermediaries.
Lizzeri (1999) shows the by now well known result that certification intermediaries
choose two categories (corresponding to investment grade and junk bonds) and set
a cutoff at 0 which is the first-best level. (Note that this result can also be viewed
as only one rating category being chosen – investment grade – and other assets not
being rated.) Lizzeri (1999)’s work has been extended in a number of directions,
including Doherty, Kartasheva, and Phillips (2012)’s work on risk-averse buyers.
With risk-averse buyers, it can be optimal to have more than two categories.
Two papers allow for changes in the economic environment in a dynamic model.
In Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012) the rating agency trades off short term profits
from consumers taking the rating at face value and long term reputational concerns.
They assume that in a boom the fraction of naive consumers is high and, together
with a low default risk, this gives the agency an incentive to inflate ratings during
booms. Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013) investigate the quality of ratings when accu-
racy is costly for the agency. They combine reputational concerns with the change
of economic fundamentals which affect, e.g., the costs for accuracy, possible profits
and the default probability. They find that the rating quality is lower in booms than
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in recessions. Our analysis is complementary to these articles, since we show that a
rating agency has an incentive to distort ratings even if all investors are rational and
it is costless for the rating agency to assess the quality of the rating. Our results
rely on the joint distribution of aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty.
In a wider sense, our paper also relates to the literature on experts and reputa-
tion. Reputation gives an incentive to report truthfully. Strausz (2005) shows that
reputation leads to monopolization and that honest certification may require a price
above that of a monopolist. Nevertheless, reputation is often not enough to ensure
accurate information transmission (see Ottaviani and Sørensen, 2006; Bouvard and
Levy, 2009; Mariano, 2008; Pollrich and Wagner, 2013). Mathis, McAndrews, and
Rochet (2009) show that reputation and confidence cycles may exist, because the
certifier likes to build up reputation so as to later inflate the grades and make larger
profits.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
shows that it is optimal to rate according to a simple cutoff rule and Section 4
derives conditions under which this cutoff is positive or negative. Section 5 describes
a stylized empirical identification strategy. Section 6 shows that with risk-averse
investors several rating classes can be optimal but that the effects of aggregate
uncertainty on the optimal cutoff remain. Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
There is one rating agency, a continuum of firms, and a continuum of possible
investors. Each firm sells a bond of quality t, where t is a random variable with
support [t, t] with t < 0 < t. The firm has private information about the quality.
Investors are risk neutral and an investor’s expected gross utility from buying the
good is equal to the quality t. A firm’s utility of retaining the bond is normalized
to zero. The quality t of the bond can be thought of as capturing the probability of
default and the loss given default.
There are N different states of the world. The probability of the world being in
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state i is εi. Having a two dimensional distribution (different states of the world,
different distributions of qualities in each state of the world) adds a considerable
amount of complexity. To still have a tractable model, we impose a restriction on
this two dimensional distribution. We assume that there is a mass κi of sellers whose
quality t is so low that one would never want to rate them (we will formalize this
later on in Assumption 2). There is a mass µi of sellers whose quality t is so high
that one would always want to rate them. And then there is a mass λi of sellers with
intermediate qualities t ∈ (t, t). We allow for arbitrary distributions of κi, λi, µi
(with the only restrictions that the sum κi + λi +µi is constant and Assumption 2),
but restrict the distribution conditional on being in (t, t) to be a distribution F
which is the same for all states. We assume that F is continuously differentiable







Figure 1: κi and µi are the mass points at t and t in state i. λi is the mass in state
i that is allotted to the types t ∈ (t, t) with the distribution F .
Further, define the expected masses on (t, t) as µ̃ :=
∑
i εiµi and on t as λ̃ :=∑
i εiλi. Normalize λ̃ to 1. The probabilities εi and the distributions of quality are
known to all players.
A firm can choose to pay an upfront fee P to the rating agency in order to get
rated before the state of the world becomes known to market participants. The
agency rates firms that paid for a rating according to a precommitted rating strat-
egy.4
The timing of moves is as follows:
4It does not matter in equilibrium whether the strategy is known at the beginning or not.
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• The agency sets the rating fee P and commits to a rating strategy s, s(t) = r,
s : R→ R ∪ {∅}.
• Nature draws the state of the world i and quality t of each firm.
• The firms observe their own qualities, but not the state of the world, and
decide whether to go to the agency to ask for a rating or not. This decision
depends on the own type t, the strategy of the agency s and the price P .
• The agency observes the quality of the firms asking for ratings and gives rat-
ings according to its strategy. The ratings are publicly observable. However,
investors do not observe whether a firm went to the rating agency if the firm
gets no rating (∅).
• Observing the state of the world, the buyers decide how much to bid in a second
price auction for a good. Since it is a second price auction, buyers bid their own
expected valuation which depends on their belief about the expected quality
given the information (s, P, r, i). Assuming that there are more investors than
firms, investors will pay exactly the expected quality in equilibrium.
To solve the setup for equilibria we use Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. We restrict
the strategy of the firms to pure strategies and look at symmetric equilibria.
The profits of the agency in one state of the world is the rating fee P times the
mass of firms asking for a rating. This mass depends on P and the rating strategy s.
The agency is risk neutral and chooses s and P to maximize expected profits before
knowing the state of the world.
The rating agency’s rating strategy s partitions the set [t, t] into M subsets, with
each subset m = 1, ...,M being the set of types Tm = {t|s(t) = rm} with M distinct
rm.
5 We will call these subsets rating classes in the following. Since in the end only
5Technically speaking, there are M + 1 subsets because there can be types which do not receive
any rating, s(t) = ∅. We will show in the following of this paper that it cannot be optimal to have
more than two rating categories. Therefore, for the sake of notational simplicity, we do not consider
an uncountable infinity of rating classes. To take into account the possibility of an uncountable
infinity of rating classes, e.g. full disclosure, one could use the correspondence T (r) = {t|s(t) = r}
with r ∈ R ∪ {∅} instead of the sets {Tm}Mm=1.
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the M distinguishable classes {Tm}Mm=1 matter and not the labels {rm}Mm=1 attached
to them, the following analysis will focus on {Tm}.
It is useful to define the expected quality in state i conditional on t being above











A firm in (t, t) attaches probability ε̂i := εiλi/λ̃ to being in state i. Consequently,






In the following, we will assume that the virtual valuation function attached to Ẽ(x)





Assumption 1. Ẽ(x)− Ẽ ′(x)1−F (x)+µ̃
f(x)





This assumption basically ensures that the second-order condition is fulfilled
whenever the first-order condition is fulfilled and it excludes the corner solution
that it is optimal to only rate t. Monotonicity of the virtual valuation function is a
standard assumption, see e.g. Myerson (1981).






tdF (t) + µit
κi
, ∀i = 1, ..., N
Assumption 2 makes sure that we do not have to deal with the uninteresting
corner solution in which the rating agency wants to rate all firms, including t firms
(see Lemma 1 below).6
To avoid analytical intractability even for simple aggregate distributions we have
described above an assumption on the idiosyncratic distribution, namely that there
6Without Assumption 2, our results for the interior solutions given by the first-order conditions
would still hold, but we would have to distinguish between the cases with an interior solution and
a corner solution.
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are two mass points at t and t, respectively, and that the density on (t, t) moves
proportionally in different states. This simplification buys us a surprising level of
generality in terms of the distribution of aggregate uncertainty: we do not need to
make any assumptions about a first-order stochastic dominance ranking of different
states of the world and do not need to assume the monotone likelihood ratio property.
Our assumption can be viewed as the distribution above a threshold being collapsed
into the mass point t and the distribution below a threshold being collapsed into t.
3 Optimality of Threshold Rating Strategy
In the following, we will show that it is optimal to rate all firms in an interval [x, t]
in one rating class and not to give a rating to all firms with t < x. Formally, s(t) = 1
for all t ≥ x and s(t) = ∅ for all t < x.7 We will show this in four steps. First, we
show that it cannot be optimal to exclude type t. Second, we show that the price
of a rating is determined by firms with t < t. Third, given that t is included, it
is optimal to have only one rating class rather than multiple classes. Fourth, given
that there is only one rating class, the set of types belonging to this class has to be
convex.
While the following Lemmas are intuitive, their proofs are surprisingly long.
We therefore provide an intuition in the main text and relegate the proofs to the
Appendix.
Lemma 1. (i) It cannot be optimal that t ∈ ∪Mm=1Tm. (ii) It cannot be optimal that
t 6∈ ∪M̃m=1T̃m.
Part (i) of the Lemma holds by Assumption 1. The intuition for part (ii) of the
Lemma is that t should be included in the rating because it increases the mass of
rated firms as well as, due to its high type, other firms’ willingness to pay for a
rating.
Next, we state a lemma which will be useful throughout our analysis. The lemma




and with t = t are in the same rating class,
7This is equivalent to s(t) = 1 for all t ≥ x and s(t) = 0 for all t < x because firms with t < x
are not rated in equilibrium.
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have a lower willingness to pay for a rating than firms with
t = t.





t = t. The willingness to pay for a rating is higher for t than for t ∈ (t, t).
The reason is that firms update ε̂i differently and we show that firms with a type
t assign a higher probability to states with higher expected quality than firms with
t ∈ (t, t). Lemma 2 can be used to prove the next lemma, which states that if there
are multiple rating classes and the highest type t is included, then it is better to
merge all rating classes to one single class.





with M̃ > 1 if
t ∈ ∪M̃m=1T̃m.
Considering types that the agency intends to attract, the rating fee is always
determined by the type with the lowest willingness to pay for a rating. Merging the
rating class with a lowest willingness to pay with classes with a higher willingness to
pay, the expected quality and thus, also the minimum willingness to pay increase.
The next lemma states that all firms above a threshold are rated which means
that no types in between are excluded.
Lemma 4. If M = 1 and t ∈ T1, then T1 has to be convex.
If the set were not convex, there would be at least one unrated hole in the middle
and the agency could rate firms in the hole instead of rating some other types below
with the same mass. This would increase the expected type in every state and,
therefore, also the rating fee the agency could charge from the firms. Therefore, a
non-convex T1 cannot be optimal.
Lemmas 1, 3, and 4 together lead to the following proposition.
Proposition 1. It is optimal to choose M = 1 with T1 = [x, t] for some x.
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Proposition 1 shows that the best equilibrium for the rating agency is such that
the agency offers the following ratings strategy:
s(t) =
1 if t ≥ x,∅ otherwise,
that is, all firms above some cutoff x get a positive rating. Subsequently, all firms
with t ∈ [x, t] get rated and investors pay the expected quality over [x, t].
As usual in such models, there is a multiplicity of equilibria in the subgame
following the ratings agency’s announcement of its price P and rating strategy s.
For example, there is the trivial equilibrium in which no firm applies for a rating
and investors have the off-equilibrium belief that firms that do get a rating are of
the worst possible rated quality x. Since x is less than the price of a rating P , it is
a best response for firms to stay unrated.
The usual arguments for selecting the equilibrium we described apply: The rating
agency has a first-mover advantage, hence, it is reasonable that the equilibrium most
favorable to the rating agency will be selected. Further, by a small perturbation of
its strategy, the rating agency can get rid of undesired equilibria. For example, if
no firm gets a rating, the agency might incentivize the first firms who apply for a
rating in order to jump-start the market.8
4 Optimal Threshold
By Proposition 1 we can restrict our attention to threshold rules which consist of all
types above a cutoff x being pooled in one class and all types below not being rated.
If there were only one state of the world, the optimal threshold would be x = 0. To
see this, take a model with only one state of the world, e.g. by setting µi = µ̃ and
8A simple, albeit extreme example is the following: As long as not all firms with a quality
t ∈ [x, t] enter, firms get their rating fees refunded and get an additional small compensation. This
makes sure that any equilibrium in which not all firms in [x, t] get rated breaks down, so that the
refund never has to be paid in equilibrium.
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λi = λ̃ = 1 for all i. Then the agency’s profit is
Π = (1− F (x) + µ̃)
∫ t
x
tdF (t) + µ̃t




tdF (t) + µ̃t.
which is equal to welfare. The first derivative is
∂Π
∂x
= −xf(x), which is equal 0 if
x = 0. Therefore, the optimal threshold for the agency is x = 0.9 This special case
of our model corresponds to Lizzeri (1999)’s results.











=(1− F (x) + µ̃)Ẽ(x)
where Ẽ(x) is the expected value of a rating from a firm’s perspective which assigns
the probabilities ε̂i to different states.














Ei(x)(λi(1− F (x)) + µi)εi.











(λi(1− F (x))E0(x) + µit)εi
=(1− F (x) + µ̃)Ê(x)
with
Ê(x) :=
(1− F (x))E0(x) + µ̃t
1− F (x) + µ̃
,
9It is easy to check that the second-order condition is also satisfied at x = 0.
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which can also be written as
Ê(x) =
∑
i εi(λi(1− F (x)) + µi)Ei(x)
1− F (x) + µ̃
.
Ê(x) is the expected value of a rating from a welfare perspective which takes into
account that the quantity of firms being rated (λi(1 − F (x)) + µi) is different in
every state. In the following, we will drop the argument x in Ei(x), E0(x), Ẽ(x),
Ê(x) when it is unambiguous in order to simplify notation. Ê and Ẽ compare in
the following way.
Lemma 5. The value of a rating is larger from a welfare then from a firm’s per-
spective; Ê ≥ Ẽ for all x.
This implies that W (x) ≥ Π(x). For non-degenerate distributions of the state of
the world, the inequality is strict and in contrast to a one-state-of-the-world setup
the rating agency cannot extract the whole surplus, W (x) > Π(x).10
The derivative of the profit with respect to the cutoff is








 Ẽ(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal effect







and we will show later that the first order condition is sufficient for profit maximiza-
tion. Thus, the profit maximizing cutoff is given by Π′(x) = 0. Changing the cutoff
has two opposite effects on the agency’s profit; increasing the cutoff decreases the
mass of firms asking to be rated (marginal effect) but it also increases the expected
quality of firms being rated and by this it increases a firm’s willingness to pay for
being rated (inframarginal effect).
We call the expression in the squared brackets in (1) the virtual valuation function
10Even if ε̂i = εi for all i, the inequality is strict for non-degenerated distributions. Besides by
the updating of ε̂i, the difference between Ê and Ẽ is caused by the different mass of firms being
rated in different states of the world.
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for Ẽ.11 By Assumption 1 it is monotone and, thus, the first order condition is
sufficient to find an optimum.12 This also implies that there is a unique solution of
the first order condition.
We are interested in comparing the profit maximizing cutoff with the welfare
maximizing cutoff. Thus, we also have to determine the socially optimal cutoff. The
derivative of welfare with respect to the threshold is
W ′(x) = −f(x)
 Ê(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal effect






or written in a simpler way




which is the same as for one state of the world. The derivative is 0 if x = 0 and
thus, the welfare maximizing cutoff is at 0.
































=W (x) + L(x)
where L(x) := −
∑
j Ej ε̂j(µj−E[µ]) is the non-extractable part of the surplus (”loss”
compared to extracting total surplus). Remember that W ′(0) = 0 which implies that









12The second order condition follows directly from Assumption 1. That we do not have a corner
solution at x = t can be seen by observing that the profit Π(x) is continuous at x = t and
limx→t Π
′(x) < 0. Assumption 2 implies that there is no corner solution at x = t (see proof of
Lemma 1).
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L′(0) = Π′(0). Thus, the incentive for the agency to distort the rating compared to
the welfare maximizing rating is given by the sign of L′(0). The optimal cutoff is
positive if L′(0) > 0 and it is negative if L′(0) < 0.
















The proof of Proposition 2 is provided in the Appendix.
Since the expression before the parenthesis is always positive, the sign of L′(0)
and, therefore, the sign of the profit maximizing cutoff depends on the sign of(










. Ê − Ẽ is positive and can be interpreted as the differ-











is that it is the variance divided by the mean of the
posterior distribution of Ei and it reflects the uncertainty about the state of the
world: if this uncertainty is sufficiently large, the cutoff is negative. The reason for
this is that firms care less about the effect of the cutoff x on the expected quality of
a rated firm if the expected quality is to a large extent driven by uncertainty about
the state of the world. Thus, the sign of L′(0) is determined by the difference of
the expected value of a rating and the ratio of variance to mean of the posterior
distribution of Ei.
While the above expression for L′(0) provides some insights on the determinants
of the optimal cutoff, it is difficult to use it for comparitive statics, since a change of
the mean and variance of Ei will also change Ê. Therefore, in the following, we will
express L′(0) in terms of the moments of the posterior distribution of Ei. Because











Ei − t+ t− E0
t− Ei
= (1− F (x))
(









Plugging (4) into the definition of Ê we get
Ê =
(1− F (x))E0 + µ̃t






































kth derivative of 1
t(1−ei)











Using these derivatives one can construct a Taylor series of 1
t(1−ei)
with respect to ei











































i is the kth moment of the posterior distribution of ei. This
implies that we can write
Ê = t− t



















































Observing that everything outside of the square brackets is positive and that the
optimal cutoff has the same sign as L′(0) yields the main proposition of our paper:
Proposition 3. Define
S := 1− 1




The optimal cutoff is positive if S > 0, negative if S > 0, and zero if S = 0.
Note that S only depends on the moments of ei, more precisely, it depends only
on the mean m1, the second moment m2 and the sum of all higher moments m3+.
For example, assume that L′(0) < 0. Keeping the mean and the second moment
constant and increasing the sum of higher moments, S increases and L′(0) can switch
signs from negative to positive.
We can calculate the threshold m3+ for which L
′(0) is 0. Set
1− 1









Observe that m3+ is always positive because m1 > m2 and m2 −m21 is the variance
of ei. This implies that for m3+ < m3+ the expression S is negative and thus
L′(0) = Π′(0) < 0.
Proposition 4. The optimal cutoff for the rating agency is negative if m3+ < m3+
and positive if m3+ > m3+.
We also derive thresholds for m1 and m2. First, observe that S is increasing
in m1 and decreasing in m2 given that m1,m2,m3+ > 0. Second, by setting the
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expression in square brackets to zero and solving for m1 and m2, respectively, one
gets thresholds for m1 and m2 that determine whether the cutoff of the rating agency
is positive or negative. The thresholds are stated in the following two Propositions.
Proposition 5. The optimal cutoff for the rating agency is negative if m1 < m1







4m2 + (2m2 +m3+)2
)
Proposition 6. The optimal cutoff for the rating agency is negative if m2 > m2







2m3+ + 1 + (2m1 +m3+)2 + 2m3+ + 1
)
Both thresholds, m1 and m2, are positive given that m1,m2,m3+ > 0.
An intuition for these results is that with a high variance and a small higher
order skewness (i.e left-skewed distribution), the value of a rating is highly volatile,
not because of the rating strategy, but because of aggregate uncertainty. Hence
the rating agency worries less about keeping the value of the rating high by being
restrictive on which firms get a rating.
Propositions 4, 5, and 6 have a striking implication: the rating agency has more
of an incentive to be too lenient if the distribution of aggregate uncertainty is more
left skewed (in the sense of a smaller higher order skewness, i.e. a lower m3+), the
mean is smaller, or the variance is larger. Left skewness and a high variance can be
reasonably considered as being associated with a period preceding the beginning of
a crisis. For moments that can be reasonably associated with a period shortly after
a crisis (right skewness, low variance), incentive of the rating agency move in the
opposite direction: the rating agency has an increasing incentive to be too strict.
This gives the rating agency an incentive to rate procyclically: excessively lenient
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ratings expand investments during booms, excessively restrictive ratings restrict
investments during recessions. Observe that the mean of aggregate uncertainty has
a counter cyclical effect; a small expected average, which can be associated with a
period shortly after a crisis, gives the rating agency an incentive to be too lenient.
The opposite holds for a high expected average.
4.1 Example of Beta Distributions
It is illustrative to parametrize the posterior distribution of Ei as a Beta distribution
with support [E0, t], i.e. Ei having a density h(y) ∝ yα−1(1 − y)β−1, where y =
(Ei −E0)/(t−E0). The distribution of Ei/t is determined by the three parameters
α, β, and e0 := E0/t. (The upper bound of the support of Ei/t is 1.) These three







(α + β)2(1 + α + β)
+m21
m3+ =
α + β − 1
(1− e0)(β − 1)
− 1−m1 −m2
It can be shown that this is a one-to-one mapping from (α, β, e0) to (m1,m2,m3+).
13
One can use this one-to-one mapping for comparative statics with respect to say m3+
13The mapping in the opposite direction can be derived in closed form, but the resulting ex-
pressions are rather long and uninformative and therefore omitted. m1 and m2 are the well-
known first two moments of the Beta distribution. m3+ can be derived by observing that
E[(1 − y)−1(1 − e0)−1] = E[
∑∞
k=0(e0 + (1 − e0)y)k] = E[
∑∞
k=0 e
k] = 1 + m1 + m2 + m3+, where
e = Ei/t = e0 + (1 − e0)y. For a Beta distribution with density h(y) = yα−1(1 − y)β−1/B(α, β)












B(α, β − 1)
B(α, β)
=
α+ β − 1
β − 1
,





and the property Γ(x+ 1) = xΓ(x) of the Gamma function which imply
B(α, β) =
Γ(α)Γ(β − 1)(β − 1)
Γ(α+ β − 1)(α+ β − 1)
=
β − 1
α+ β − 1
B(α, β − 1).
Putting this together yields the expression for m3+.
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while keeping m1 and m2 constant. Figure 2 shows a Beta distribution with α = 3,
β = 5 and e0 = 0.1 (dashed line). For this distribution, L
′(0) = 0, i.e. the rating
agencies sets the cutoff at exactly the socially optimal level x = 0. For the dotted
line, m1 and m2 are kept constant and m3+ is reduced by 0.01. The dotted line
has a fatter lower tail which means that it has a higher mass at the bottom of the
distribution. The mean and variance remain the same, but if a crisis hits, it is more
likely to be severe. For the dotted distribution L′(0) < 0 and hence the cutoff is
negative, x < 0, which means that the rating criteria are too loose compared to the
socially optimal ones. For the solid line, m3+ is increased by 0.01 while keeping m1
and m2 constant. For this distribution L
′(0) > 0 and hence x > 0, that is, the rating
is too strict compared to the socially optimal one.
Figures 3, 4, and 5 illustrate the change of L′(0) as m3+, m1, and m2 are changed,
respectively, while keeping the other parameters constant. The optimal cutoff for
example can switch from a negative to a positive cutoff if the mean or the higher
order skewness increase or if the variance decreases. For all values of m1, m2, and
m3+, the parameters α, β, and e0 are in permissible ranges.
14







Figure 2: Density of Ei/t for α = 3, β = 5, e0 = 0.1 (dashed line). For the dotted
line, m3+ is reduced by 0.01, for the solid line, m3+ is increased by 0.01, while m1 and
m2 are kept constant. (The corresponding parameters are α = 4.4322, β = 5.8781,
e0 = 0.013363 for the dotted and α = 2.23, β = 4.38985, e0 = 0.151755 for the solid
distribution.)








L ' H 0 L
Figure 3: Values of L′(0) as m3+ is changed and m1 and m2 are kept constant.
Starting point is α = 3, β = 5, e0 = 0.1 (which corresponds to m1 = 0.4375,
m2 = 0.2125, and m3+ = 0.294444) for which L
′(0) = 0. Further parameters are
normalized to t = 1 and f(0) = 1.
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Figure 4: Values of L′(0) as m1 is changed and m2 and m3+ are kept constant.
Starting point is α = 3, β = 5, e0 = 0.1 (which corresponds to m1 = 0.4375,
m2 = 0.2125, and m3+ = 0.294444) for which L
′(0) = 0. Further parameters are
normalized to t = 1 and f(0) = 1.
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Figure 5: Values of L′(0) as m2 is changed and m1 and m3+ are kept constant.
Starting point is α = 3, β = 5, e0 = 0.1 (which corresponds to m1 = 0.4375,
m2 = 0.2125, and m3+ = 0.294444) for which L
′(0) = 0. Further parameters are
normalized to t = 1 and f(0) = 1.
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5 Empirical Implications
Our model shows how the rating agency’s incentive to be too lenient or too strict
depends on the moments of aggregate uncertainty. Since these moments cannot be
observed directly, one may wonder about the empirical content of our model.
First, it should be noted that an empirical estimate of the distribution of aggre-
gate uncertainty is non-trivial, especially if the main concern is about the distribu-
tion of aggregate uncertainty shortly before a crisis. The reason is that only few
crises occur, so it is difficult to have larger amounts of data.
However, an empirical estimate of market participants’ beliefs about the distri-
bution of aggregate uncertainty can be obtained. We illustrate the basic idea of how
to estimate these moments in a strongly stylized setup containing the core idea of
the empirical strategy.
Consider the following stylized setup. There is an index for the bonds being sold
by the firms in the market. As an example, one can think of a subprime mortgages-
backed securities index. Further, there is a market for financial derivatives based
on this index. Call options on the index can be bought in the first period of the
model, before aggregate uncertainty is realized.15 The options expire in the second
period after aggregate uncertainty has realized. Time is discrete and the options
are European options.16 Further, aggregate uncertainty is such that the mid-quality
firms’ beliefs are the same as the general market beliefs, formally, ε̂i = εi for all i.
17
Suppose that the cut-off of the agency is close to 0 (x ≈ 0), so that the value of the
index Ei(x) is well approximated by Ei(0).
Further, assume that there exists a call option with strike price yi = Ei for
each state of the world i. Without loss of generality, order the states of the world
increasingly, i.e. Ej > Ei if j > i. The second-period value of a call option with
15For the sake of simplicity, we focus on call options on an index. One could also think of put
options on an index or e.g. mortgage credit default swap ABX indices.
16In a discrete two-period model, it does not matter whether the option is European or American.
In a continuous time model, calculations for American options are somewhat more complex, but
standard and well known in the literature.
17A sufficient condition is that λi = λ̃ for all i, that is, aggregate uncertainty enters through
changes of κi and µi for different states of the world i.
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strike price yj in state i is Ei−yj if Ei > yj and 0 if Ei ≤ yj. Denote the first-period
price of option j with strike price yj as Oj. Oj is given by the market’s expected




εi max{Ei − yj, 0} =
N∑
i=j+1
εi(Ei − Ej) (7)
where the second equality follows from yj = Ej. (For i = N , Oj = 0.)
The next proposition shows that given a set of call options, the information
on their strike prices yj and first-period prices Oj identifies the market’s beliefs
about the distribution of aggregate uncertainty; it identifies the probability εi for
the expected quality Ei. The proof is provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 7. Given strike prices and first period prices {(yj, Oj)}Nj=1, the proba-















A similar result can be obtained for a continuous distribution of Ei. For the
continuous distribution version, drop the index in Ei and denote the distribution of
E as G. Assume that prices O(y) for call options with a continuum of strike prices
















This is analogous to the discrete distribution result and the distribution G is non-
parametrically identifiable given data on call option prices.
In practice, one expects to observe less options than there are states of the world,
so parametric assumptions are required to be able to estimate the distribution of E.
In the following, we make the parametric assumption that the distribution G is
a polynomial with lower bound of support E0 and upper bound t. As an example,
consider a cubic function
G(E) = a1 + 2a2E + 3a3E
2 + 4a4E
3.













Suppose we observe data for five call options with strike prices {yj}5j=1 and
option prices {O(yj)}5j=1. In this case, the parameters {ai}4i=0 are given by the
linear equation system






j , j = 1, ..., 5. (8)





is non-singular, the equation system (8)
yields a unique solution for the variables {ai}4i=0. Note that E0 and t are uniquely
pinned down by the parameters {ai}4i=0 and by the equations G(E0) = 0 and G(t) =
0.18
Given the distribution G of E, we can obtain the distribution of e = E/t and
18While the G(E) has multiple roots due to G being a polynomial, the solution of G(E0) = 0 is
unique nonetheless. This is because of the constraints G′(E) > 0 for E ∈ [E0, t] and yj ∈ [E0, t]
for all j. By the same reasoning, there is a unique solution of G(t) = 1.
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the moments m1, m2, m3+ of e. This in turn yields
S = 1− 1
1 +m1 +m2 +m3+
− m2
m1
from expression Proposition 3 and determines the sign of the marginal profit Π′(0)
at x = 0. Table 1 provides examples of hypothetical observed prices of call options
and corresponding estimated parameters, moments, and S. For the first set of
observations (first line), the rating agency has an incentive to choose the cutoff at
the first best level x = 0. For the second line and third line, the agency has an
incentive to choose a negative and a positive cutoff, respectively.
observed prices estimated parameters moments S
O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 a1 a2 a3 a4 m1 m2 m3+
11 8.0 5.7 3.9 2.6 -0.37 0.0096 -0.000030 3.4×10−8 0.35 0.15 0.30 0.0
5.9 4.1 2.7 1.8 1.1 0.0 0.0077 -0.000026 3.4×10−8 0.24 0.095 0.12 -0.073
14 10 7.2 4.9 3.2 -0.89 0.014 -0.000043 5.1×10−8 0.41 0.20 0.37 0.019
Table 1: Example of parameter estimates for data on call option prices Oj = O(yj)
for strike prices (y1, y2, y3, y4, y5) = (80, 90, 100, 110, 120).
We have illustrated the basic idea behind an empirical strategy to estimate the
moments of aggregate uncertainty. To practically apply this strategy, several addi-
tional steps are required, which are beyond the scope of this article. First, one needs
to construct synthetic call options for the index of the bonds being rated. Second,
the pricing of options in a multi-period environment is more complicated than the
simple two-period setup we used for illustrative purposes. These problems are far
from trivial, but well studied in Finance, see e.g. Hull (2009). Additionally, one
could use a different parametrization for G instead of the polynomial parametriza-
tion or, if sufficiently many observations are available, one could possibly even use
a non-parametric estimate of the function O(y) given the observations {yj, O(yj)}j.
Further, one would also want to estimate the confidence interval for S.
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6 Risk-aversion
In the main part of this paper we have assumed that investors are risk neutral and
we have shown that it is optimal for the agency to pool all types above a cutoff
in one rating class. Doherty, Kartasheva, and Phillips (2012) extend the model of
Lizzeri (1999) by allowing investors to be risk-averse and they show that, if the level
of risk aversion is sufficiently high, the rating agency rates types above a cutoff in
several rating classes.
First, following the paper of Doherty et al. (2012) we provide a simplified hybrid
model incorporating risk aversion and aggregate uncertainty. We show that intro-
ducing risk aversion in a model with several states of the world can also yield several
rating classes. In this case our previous analysis can be interpreted as determining
the optimal cutoff of the lowest investment grade rating class (e.g. BBB). Second,
we provide a numerical example to show that the effects of the moments of the ex-
pected quality distribution on the optimal cutoff have the same sign as before even
with risk aversion and several rating classes.
We provide the simplest possible setup which is rich enough to illustrate the idea.
Assume that buyers are risk-averse. Their utility of an asset is equal to t but their
expected utility depends on both the mean and the variance of the quality of the
asset they buy. We include a second mass point at t2, t2 ≥ t, with mass γi in state
i. To avoid confusion denote t by t1. See Fig. 6.
If buyers are risk-averse, a welfare maximizing rating strategy needs to perfectly
disclose the type of all assets with a positive value because any kind of pooling
and being vague about a firm’s quality leads to a welfare loss. However, such a
strategy cannot be optimal for the rating agency.19 To analyze a general model with
risk-aversion is beyond the scope of this article. In the following, we compare two
rating strategies: (i) pooling all types above a cutoff in one rating class, which is
the optimal strategy without risk-aversion, and (ii) a strategy in which the agency
only pools low types and rates high types separately. Doherty et al. (2012) show
19To ensure that all firms with t ≥ 0 are willing to pay the rating fee under full disclosure, the

















Figure 6: κi, µi and γi are the mass points at t, t1 and t2 in state i. λi is the mass
in state i that is allotted to the types t ∈ (t, t) with the distribution F .
that strategy (ii) is optimal in a model with one state of the world if the level of
risk-aversion is sufficiently high.
Analogously to the case without risk-aversion, we derive the profit of the agency
if it pools all types above a cutoff x in one class. The expected type above a cutoff
x is
Qi(x) := E[t|t ≥ x]
and the variance is
σi(x) := Var[t|t ≥ x].
The buyer’s valuation for the asset of a seller in this rating class is
Qi(x)− aσi(x)
where a is a measure for risk-aversion. If a = 0, the buyers are risk-neutral and the
model is equivalent to the one before.














where γ̃ is the expected value of γ, γ̃ =
∑
i εiγi.
Alternatively, the rating agency can pool t ∈ [x, t1] and rate t2 separately as
shown in Fig. 6. If the agency rates types t2 in a separate class, these sellers are
willing to pay a high rating fee (up to t2) and therefore the rating fee is determined
by sellers in the class t ∈ [x, t1]. Keeping the cutoff x constant, the mass of rated
firms is the same for both strategies and the rating fee decides which rating strategy
yields higher profits. If the agency pools types t ∈ [x, t1], the expected type in this
rating class is smaller than Qi(x) but the variance is also smaller than σi(x). Thus,
it is not straight forward to see under which strategy the rating fee can be higher.
Now, we derive sufficient conditions such that the agency prefers to rate t2 sep-
arately instead of pooling all types above x in one rating class. Define zi := γit2
and z̃ as the expected value of zi, z̃ :=
∑
i εizi. Rewrite z̃ as z̃ = t2γ̃, which can be
interpreted as the agency’s profit if it charges a rating fee of t2 and rates only firms
with type t2. Remember that Π(x) is defined as the profit if the agency rates only
t ∈ [x, t1] and pools them all in one class. The sufficient condition is given in the
following proposition, the proof being provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 8. Take an arbitrary cutoff x. For any z̃ with z̃ ≤ Π(x) there exists
a T 2 such that for all t2 ≥ T 2 the rating agency is better off pooling t ∈ [x, t1] and
rating t2 in a separate class than pooling all types above x in one rating class.
Since investors are risk-averse, their expected utility buying an asset in a given
rating class decreases if the variance inside this rating class becomes larger. If the
variance is sufficiently large, investors are not willing to pay any positive price for
an asset even if the expected quality is positive. Thus, if the variance is large, the
agency is better off splitting the types in several rating classes in order to reduce the
variance inside one class and to increase investors’ willingness to pay for an asset.
The condition that z̃ ≤ Π(x) ensures that the agency does not prefer to charge a
rating fee of t2 and to exclude firms with t < t2 from the rating.
Risk aversion does not only have the effect of multiple rating classes becoming
optimal, but it also has an additional effect on the optimal cutoff. Increasing the
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cutoff reduces the variance in a rating class and this can give additional incentives
to increase the cutoff.20 In the following we provide numerical examples in which
we show that the effects of the first, second, and higher moments are similar to our
analysis without risk aversion.21 In the numerical example we have four states of
the world. We take the Generalized Pareto distribution F (t) = 1− ((1− t)/2)3 for
t ∈ (−1, 1) and fix t1 = 1. This gives us E0 = 1/4. We fix λ = 5, t2 = 110, and
νi = 0.0001 for all i. The states only differ in the weights µi at the mass point
at t1, with µ1 = 0.03, µ2 = 0.2, µ3 = 0.4, and µ4 = 0.7. Changing the moments
of the aggregate distribution, we keep the distribution inside a state constant (and
therefore also the expected type) and only vary the probabilities for the different
states. There is a one-to-one mapping from (ε1, ε2, ε3) to (m1,m2,m3+) and the
fourth probability is pinned down by ε4 = 1 − ε1 − ε2 − ε3. For all values of the
example, the probabilities are in [0, 1].
Figures 7, 8, and 9 illustrate the change of the optimal cutoff as m3+, m1 and
m2 are changed while keeping the other moments constant. The solid line is the
optimal cutoff for a = 0, the dashed line for a = 0.01 and the dotted-dashed line
for a = 0.02. If investors are risk neutral, a = 0, the agency pools all types above
the cutoff in one class. For a = 0.01 and a = 0.02, investors are risk averse and the
agency prefers to pool all types t ∈ [x, t1] in one class and to rate t2 separately. Note
that increasing the level of risk aversion leads to an increase in the optimal cutoff x∗.
The figures show that our results from the main part of the paper carry over to a
setup including risk-aversion: Keeping the other moments constant, a higher mean,
a lower variance, or an increase in the higher order skewness lead to an increase in
the optimal cutoff. For changes with the opposite sign, the optimal cutoff decreases.
Hence, results from the risk-neutral setup carry over qualitatively to a setup with
20Doherty et al. (2012) show that the optimal cutoff can be positive even with only one state of
the world if the level of risk aversion is sufficiently high.
21In the main part of the paper the moments were defined for the distribution of the expected
type in [0, t] (scaled by t). For the sake of comparison, in the numerical examples the moments
are defined for the distribution of the expected type in [x, t1] and thus, the expected type is not
influenced by changes in the mass on t2. We deviate from our previous analysis by taking the
threshold x as the lower bound of the interval. In this way we can determine the optimal cutoff
explicitly and not only its sign.
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risk aversion. A setup with risk aversion comes at the cost of being analytically
intractable, but has the desirable feature that it makes the more realistic prediction
of multiple rating classes.







Figure 7: Values of the optimal threshold x∗ as m3+ is changed and m1 and m2 are
kept constant. For the solid line a = 0, for the dashed line a = 0.01 and for the
dotted-dashed line a = 0.02. The rating strategy for the solid line is to pool all
types above x. For the dashed and dotted-dashed line all types in [x, t1] are pooled
and t2 is rated separately. (The starting values are εi = 1/4 for all i. This implies
m1 = 0.47627, m2 = 0.244859 and as a starting value m3+ = 0.321538.)
7 Conclusions
We have considered the profit maximizing rating strategy of a rating agency in the
face of aggregate uncertainty. We have shown that with risk neutral investors it is
still optimal for the rating agency, as in a setup without aggregate uncertainty, to
choose only one rating class for rated firms and to not rate the remaining firms.
The model’s predictions about the cutoff for the rating class strikingly differ
from the predictions of a model without aggregate uncertainty: the rating agency
has more of an incentive to be too lenient if the expected average quality is small,
the variance large, and the higher order skewness small. For larger averages, smaller
variances, and larger higher order skewness the opposite holds: the rating agency
has more of an incentive to be too strict. These results can be interpreted as ratings
having either a procyclical or an countercyclical effect. We outline an empirical
strategy to estimate the moments of aggregate uncertainty which can be used to
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Figure 8: Values of the optimal threshold x∗ as m1 is changed and m2 and m3+ are
kept constant. For the solid line a = 0, for the dashed line a = 0.01 and for the
dotted-dashed line a = 0.02. The rating strategy for the solid line is to pool all
types above x. For the dashed and dotted-dashed line all types in [x, t1] are pooled
and t2 is rated separately. (The starting values are εi = 1/4 for all i. This implies
m2 = 0.244859, m3+ = 0.321538 and as a starting value m1 = 0.47627 .)







Figure 9: Values of the optimal threshold x∗ as m2 is changed and m1 and m3+ are
kept constant. For the solid line a = 0, for the dashed line a = 0.01 and for the
dotted-dashed line a = 0.02. The rating strategy for the solid line is to pool all
types above x. For the dashed and dotted-dashed line all types in [x, t1] are pooled
and t2 is rated separately. (The starting values are εi = 1/4 for all i. This implies
m1 = 0.47627, m3+ = 0.321538 and as a starting value m2 = 0.244859.)
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determine which effect dominates.
Our analysis identifies one up to now unconsidered factor that affects the rating
strategy of an agency – aggregate uncertainty – and thereby sheds further light in
understanding the behavior of rating agencies. In line with our model, one dis-
turbing effect of using ratings as the basis for financial regulation is that a possible
procyclicality of ratings leads to a procyclicality of capital adequacy requirements
for banks, and hence to a procyclicality of lending. One solution is to avoid using
ratings as the basis for financial regulation. Another is to counterbalance the pro-
cyclicality of ratings by adding countercyclicality to capital adequacy requirements
that are based on ratings.
The usual disclaimer for the policy implications holds. This article is about a
thorough analysis of the effects of aggregate uncertainty, shutting down other effects
such as like reputation cycles, imperfect rating technology, and competition between
agencies. Further, the implications of the theory depend on the empirical moments
of the distribution of aggregate uncertainty. Hence, an empirical analysis is needed
to estimate these moments and the relative magnitude of the different effects. Our
article provides a starting point for such an empirical analysis. This paper also
serves as a word of caution: using a distribution which is pinned down by its mean
and variance (e.g. the often used normal distribution) for an empirical analysis will
neglect the impact of the higher order skewness. However, the skewness is crucial
for the incentive of the rating agency to distort ratings.
References
Bar-Isaac, H. and J. Shapiro (2013): “Ratings quality over the business cycle,”
Journal of Financial Economics, 108, 62–78.
Bolton, P., X. Freixas, and J. Shapiro (2012): “The credit ratings game,”
The Journal of Finance, 67, 85–111.
Bouvard, M. and R. Levy (2009): “Humouring both parties: a model of two-
sided reputation,” Tech. rep., working paper.
Doherty, N. A., A. V. Kartasheva, and R. D. Phillips (2012): “Information
33
effect of entry into credit ratings market: The case of insurers’ ratings,” Journal
of Financial Economics, 106, 308–330.
Hull, J. (2009): Options, futures and other derivatives, Pearson education.
Lizzeri, A. (1999): “Information revelation and certification intermediaries,” The
RAND Journal of Economics, 30, 214–231.
Mariano, B. (2008): “Do reputational concerns lead to reliable ratings?” Tech.
rep., Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics and Political Science.
Mathis, J., J. McAndrews, and J. Rochet (2009): “Rating the raters: are
reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies?” Journal of
Monetary Economics, 56, 657–674.
Myerson, R. B. (1981): “Optimal auction design,” Mathematics of operations
research, 6, 58–73.
Ottaviani, M. and P. Sørensen (2006): “Reputational cheap talk,” The Rand
journal of economics, 37, 155–175.
Pollrich, M. and L. Wagner (2013): “Informational opacity and honest certi-
fication,” SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 481.
Strausz, R. (2005): “Honest certification and the threat of capture,” International
Journal of Industrial Organization, 23, 45–62.
Viswanatha, A. and K. Freifeld (2015): “S&P reaches $1.5 billion deal with
U.S., states over crisis-era ratings,” Reuters, February 3, 2015.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. (i) Denote the class containing t as Tn. Define an alternative rating class




. Observe κit + λi
∫ t
0
tdF (t) + µit is the expected quality in T
∗
n




, and by Assumption 2 this is smaller than zero. The expected









, it follows directly that E[Tn,i] < 0.
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, 0] to raise
the expected quality. Including negative qualities in Tn can increase the expected
type in comparison to T ∗n but the expected type E[Tn,i] stays negative. Therefore,
the willingness to pay for a rating in category Tn is negative and the rating agency
prefers not to have category Tn.
(ii) Take a rating strategy {T̃m}M̃m=1. Assume that t is not in any T̃m. Define for






which is constant over all states of the world. The price is determined by the lowest
willingness to pay, minmE
∗






















Now take a rating strategy with M = M̃+1, Tm = T̃m for m ≤ M̃ and TM = {t}.


















Since in (11) the expression in square brackets is weakly greater than in (10)
and the expression in curly braces is strictly greater in (11) than in (10), we have
Π > Π̃.
Proof of Lemma 2
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if µiεi
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c = 0. (12)




t∈T tdF + µit
λi
∫
t∈T dF + µi
=
∫
t∈T tdF + µi/λit∫
t∈T dF + µi/λi




. The expected quality Ei for i ∈ A












































































































for type t ∈ (t, t), the lemma follows.
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Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Label the rating class that includes t as T̃1 and the remaining rating classes
as T̃−1 = ∪m6=1T̃m. Denote the expected type of T̃1 conditional on being in state i
as Ẽi = [
∫
t∈T̃1 tdF (t) + µit]/[
∫
t∈T̃1 dF (t) + µi]. Denote the mass of all other classes
as µ∗ =
∫

















t∈T̃−1 tdF (t)) +
∫
t∈T̃1 tdF (t) + µit
λi(
∫
t∈T̃−1 dF (t) +
∫
t∈T̃1 dF (t)) + µi
is the expected type in state i if there is only one rating class. Profits for separate











where E∗m is defined as in (9). Further, define the profit in case all rating classes











Since t∗ is a weighted average of {Ẽm}M̃m=1, we have t∗ ≥ min{Ẽm}M̃m=1 and therefore
Π̂ ≥ Π̃. (Note that Π, Π̂, and Π̃ only differ in the expressions in square brackets.)
We will prove the lemma by contradiction. Assume to the contrary that separate

























being satisfied at the same time.
The expected value Ei can be written as weighted average of t





t∈T̃−1 tdF (t) +
∫
t∈T̃1 tdF (t)) + µit
λi(
∫
t∈T̃−1 dF (t) +
∫




t∈T̃−1 dF (t) + Ẽi(
∫
t∈T̃1 λidF (t) + µi)
λi(
∫
t∈T̃−1 dF (t) +
∫
t∈T̃1 dF (t)) + µi
.
Solving for Ẽi, we get






t∈T̃1 dF (t) + µi
(Ei − t∗)



























Define two sets of states of the world; i ∈ A if Ei ≥ t∗ and i ∈ B if Ei < t∗. It holds




t∈T̃−1 tdF (t) +
∫
t∈T̃1 tdF (t)) + µi/λit
(
∫
t∈T̃−1 dF (t) +
∫
t∈T̃1 dF (t)) + µi/λi
is increasing in µi/λi. Denote cA = min {µi/λi|i ∈ A} and cB = max {µi/λi|i ∈ B}.
Note that cA > cB.
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Then (15) can be rewritten as
∑
i
ε̂i(Ei − t∗) < 0
which is equivalent to
∑
i∈A
ε̂i(Ei − t∗) +
∑
i∈B
ε̂i(Ei − t∗) < 0.
This implies[ ∫
t∈T̃−1 dF (t)∫




















t∈T̃1 dF (t) + cB
and the sum over i ∈ A is positive and the sum over i ∈ B is negative. Since
µi/λi ≥ cA for all i ∈ A and
∑
i∈A ε̂i(Ei − t∗) positive, the first expression in square
brackets in (18) is bounded form below by∫
t∈T̃−1 dF (t)∫
t∈T̃1 dF (t) + cA
∑
i∈A























t∈T̃1 dF (t) + µi/λi
(Ei − t∗). (20)
because of µi/λi ≤ cB for all i ∈ B and the negativity of
∑
i∈B ε̂i(Ei − t∗).















t∈T̃1 dF (t) + µi/λi
(Ei − t∗) < 0
which contradicts (17).
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Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Assume that T̂ is not convex. Take a convex set T ′ such that it has the
same expected mass of rated firms (
∫
t∈T̂ dF (t) =
∫
t∈T ′ dF (t)) and both sets include







t∈T tdF (t) + µit
λi
∫
t∈T dF (t) + µi
](∫
t∈T





t∈T̂ dF (t) =
∫
t∈T ′ dF (t), comparing the profits Π(T̂ ) and Π(T
′) boils down to
comparing the willingness to pay for T̂ and T ′, which is given in square brackets.
Since T̂ is not convex, there is at least one unrated hole in the middle and it is
possible to rate the mass in the holes instead of rating some types below with the
same mass. This increases
∫








is greater for T ′ than for T̂ and hence Π(T ′) > Π(T̂ ).
Therefore, it is optimal to rate a set T which is convex and includes t.
Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. Analogously to the proof of Lemma 2 define two sets of states of the world;








. It holds that
∑
i εi (µi − λiµ̃) = 0 which
we can write as
∑
A εi (µi − λiµ̃) +
∑
B εi (µi − λiµ̃) = 0. Multiplied by a constant
c = 1
(1−F )+µ̃ the expression is still equal to 0. For i ∈ A,
1
(1−F )+µi/λi is smaller than
1
(1−F )+µ̃ and for i ∈ B it is the other way round. It follows that∑
A
εi (µi − λiµ̃)
1




εi (µi − λiµ̃)
1
(1− F ) + µi/λi
< 0



















(Ê − 1− F (x) + µ̃
f






Ê − Ẽ + 1− F (x) + µ̃
f
(Ẽ ′ − Ê ′)
)
. (21)
We know that Ê ≥ Ẽ but the sign of Ẽ ′ − Ê ′ can go in both directions.
Next, we rewrite (21) such that we can express L′(x) only in terms of Ei, Ẽ, and











λi(1− F (x)) + µi
f(x)λi.





1− F (x) + µ̃
f(x).
Using these two expressions in (21), we can write
L′(x) =f(x)
(






λi(1− F (x)) + µi
λif −
Ê − x










λi(1− F (x)) + µi
λi − (Ê − x)
)
.
From the definitions of Ei and Ê we derive µi = λi(1 − F (x))Ei−E0t−Ei and µ̃ = (1 −
F (x)) Ê−E0
t−Ê which leads to
L′(x) =f(x)
(































Remember that W ′(0) = 0 which implies that L′(0) = Π′(0). Thus, the sign of L′(0)
determines the sign of the profit maximizing cutoff. To determine the sign of L′(0)











































+ Ẽ︸ ︷︷ ︸
inframarginal effect
 .
This expression gives us another way to write the inframarginal effect of a change



























Proof of Proposition 7




εi(Ei − yN−1) = εn(yN − yN−1).












where the first equality follows from (7) and the second equality can be obtained by



















that is, the expression for εj for 1 < j < N in the proposition. The expression for
ε1 simply follows from that fact that probabilities add up to one.
Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. We want to analyze the effect of a change of t2, while keeping zi = γit2
















tdF (t) + µit1 + γit2
λi(1− F (x)) + µi + γi
)2
=
(λi(1− F (x)) + µi + γi)(λi
∫ t1
x







tdF (t) + µit1 + γit2)
2
(λi(1− F (x)) + µi + γi)2
=
(λi(1− F (x)) + µi + zi/t2)(λi
∫ t1
x
t2dF (t) + µit
2
1 + zit2)− (λi
∫ t1
x
tdF (t) + µit1 + zi)
2
(λi(1− F (x)) + µi + zi/t2)2











tdF (t) + µit1 + zi
λi(1− F (x)) + µi
<∞.
It follows that for a > 0, the utility in state i, Qi(x)− aσi(x), becomes negative if t2
is large enough. This implies that buyers are not willing to pay a positive price for
a rated firm if the variance of types in one rating class is too high. Thus, for every
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cutoff x there is a t2 large enough such that the rating agency is better off pooling
t ∈ [x, t1] and rating t2 in a separate class than pooling all types above x.
A further condition that needs to be satisfied is that the agency does not prefer
to charge a rating fee of t2 and to rate only firms with type t2 which yields profits of
t2γ̃. Since we keep γit2 constant when we increase t2, the profit of only rating types
t2 stays constant. A sufficient condition for the agency to prefer to rate [x, t1] and
t2 is that the profit from pooling t ∈ [x, t1] and not rating t2 is larger than the profit
from only rating t2.
44
